The Rise of Cohabitation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970-2011 by Esteve, Albert et al.
25© The Author(s) 2016 
A. Esteve, R.J. Lesthaeghe (eds.), Cohabitation and Marriage 
in the Americas: Geo-historical Legacies and New Trends, 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31442-6_2
 Chapter 2 
 The Rise of Cohabitation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 1970–2011 
 Albert  Esteve ,  Ron J.  Lesthaeghe ,  Antonio  López-Gay , 
and  Joan  García-Román 
1  Introduction 
 This chapter offers a general overview of the often spectacular rise of the share of 
cohabitation in the process of union formation in 24 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries during the last 30 years of the twentieth and the fi rst decade of the twenty- 
fi rst century. Firstly, a brief ethnographic and historical sketch will be offered with 
the aim of illustrating the special position of many Latin American regions and sub- 
populations with respect to forms of partnership formation other than classic mar-
riage. Secondly, the national trends in the rising share of cohabitation in union 
formation will be presented for men and women for the age groups 25–29 and 
30–34. This is extended to full cohort profi les covering all ages in Brazil and 
Mexico. Thirdly, we shall inspect the education and social class differentials by 
presenting the cross-sectional gradients over time. The fourth section is devoted to 
the framework of the “second demographic transition” and hence to the 
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de-stigmatization of a number of other behaviors that were equally subject to strong 
normative restrictions in the past (e.g. divorce, abortion, homosexuality, suicide and 
euthanasia). The last section deals with the household and family contexts of mar-
ried persons and cohabitors respectively. 
 The chapter is not only meant to offer a statistical description, but also to raise 
several points that should facilitate an interpretation of the phenomenon of the 
“cohabitation boom”. A short introduction of the issues involved is now being 
presented. 
 In many provinces, and especially those with larger native and black populations, 
cohabitation and visiting unions have always existed as alternatives to the classic 
“European” marriage. However, as the data from up to fi ve census rounds indicate, 
the rise in cohabitation occurred  both in such areas with “old cohabitation” prac-
tices and in those where cohabitation had remained much more exceptional till the 
1970s. In other words, there is now a sizeable amount of “new cohabitation” besides 
or on top of “old cohabitation” (see also: Castro-Martín  2002 ; Binstock  2008 ). 
 The same census data also document the existence of a  universal negative cohab-
itation- education gradient, with women with higher levels of education cohabiting 
less and moving into marriage in greater proportions. The existence of a negative 
gradient with education, and by extension also by social class, is commonly inter-
preted as the manifestation of a “pattern of disadvantage”. In this pattern, the poorer 
segments of the population would not be able to afford a wedding and the setting up 
of a more elaborate residence, but they would move into other forms of partnership 
such as cohabitation or visiting unions. In this view, “ cohabitation is the poor man’s 
marriage ”. The “crisis hypothesis” follows a similar line of reasoning. Given the 
deep economic crises and spells of hyperinfl ation during the 1980s in almost all 
Latin American countries, the lower social strata would have reacted by further 
abandoning marriage and resorting to more cohabitation instead. 
 The matter is, however, far more complicated than just sketched. Given this neg-
ative cross-sectional gradient with education, one would expect that with advancing 
education over time many more persons would get married rather than cohabiting. 
The advancement in male and female education in Latin America has been very 
pronounced since the 1970s, and yet, just the opposite trend in marriage and cohabi-
tation is observed compared to the one predicted on the basis of the cross-sectional 
education gradient: there is now far more cohabitation and much less marriage. In 
other words, the changing educational composition not only failed to produce a 
“marriage boom”, but a “cohabitation boom” developed instead. This not only 
reveals once more the fallacy inherent in the extrapolation of cross-sectional dif-
ferentials, but illustrates even more strongly that other factors favorable to cohabita-
tion must have been “fl ying under the radar”. In this chapter we shall therefore also 
explore to what extent ideational factors, especially in the domains of ethics, sexual-
ity, secularization and gender relations, could have contributed to the emergence of 
the “cohabitation boom”. This brings us inevitably to the issue of a possible partial 
convergence of several Latin American populations to the pattern of the “Second 
Demographic Transition” (SDT) (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa  1986 ; Lesthaeghe 
 2010 ). 
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 The rise in cohabitation also begs the question whether cohabiting persons form 
nuclear families or stay with their own parents or kin instead and hence continue to 
rely on residential extended family structures. In other words, is the rise of cohabita-
tion a source of family simplifi cation (nuclearization), or are the residential house-
hold compositions essentially untouched? 
 We shall now turn to the details of the points just sketched above. 
2  “Old” and “New” Cohabitation 
 Native and black populations in Latin America and the Caribbean have been known 
to have maintained patterns of union formation other than classic marriage. (e.g. 
Smith  1956 ; Roberts and Sinclair  1978 ). In the instance of American Indian indig-
enous populations, ethnographic evidence shows that they did not adhere to the 
group of populations with diverging devolution of property through women. As 
argued by J. Goody ( 1976 ), populations that pass on property via a dowry or an 
inheritance for daughters (i.e. populations with “diverging devolution” of family 
property via women) tend to stress premarital chastity, control union formation via 
arranged marriages, elaborate marriage ceremonies, and reduce the status of a mar-
ried woman within the husband’s patriarchal household. Moreover they tend toward 
endogamous marriage (cross-cousin preference) or to caste or social class homog-
amy. Through these mechanisms the property “alienated” by daughters can still stay 
within the same lineage or clan or circulate within the same caste or social class. 
Populations that are hunter-gatherers or who practice agriculture on common com-
munity land, have fewer private possessions, no diverging devolution of property 
via dowries, no strict marriage arrangements or strict rules regarding premarital or 
extramarital sex. Instead, they tend to be more commonly polygamous with either 
polygyny or polyandry, have bride service or bride price instead of dowries, and 
practice levirate or even wife-lending. The dominance of the latter system among 
American natives can be gleaned from the materials brought together in Table  2.1 .
 Table  2.1 was constructed on the basis of the 31 ethnic group references con-
tained and coded in the G.P. Murdock and D.R. White “Ethnographic Atlas” ( 1969 ), 
and another 20 group specifi c descriptions gathered in the “Yale Human Areas 
Relation Files” (eHRAF  2010 ). Via these materials, which refer mainly to the fi rst 
half of the twentieth century, we could group the various populations in broader 
ethnic clusters and geographical locations, and check the presence or absence of 
several distinguishing features of social organization. 
 Of the 41  native groups mentioned in these ethnographic samples, only one had 
an almost exclusively monogamous marriage pattern, whereas the others combined 
monogamy with polyandry often based on wife-lending, occasional polygyny asso-
ciated with life cycle phases (e.g. associated with levirate), more common polyg-
yny, or serial polygyny in the form of successive visiting unions. For 26 native 
Indian groups we have also information concerning the incidence of extramarital 
sex or of visiting unions. In only six of them these features were rare. Furthermore, 
2 The Rise of Cohabitation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970–2011
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vnone have a dowry, which implies that the feature of diverging devolution is absent, 
and that, compared to their European colonizers, these populations are located on 
the other side of the “Goody divide”. As expected, they have the opposite pattern in 
which the prospective groom or the new husband has to render services to his in- 
laws or pay a certain sum of money to his wife’s kin. In a number of instances, there 
was also a custom of women or sister exchange in marriage between two bands or 
clans, and there were also instances with just gift exchanges or no exchanges at all. 
And fi nally, mentions of elaborate marriage ceremonies were only found among the 
references to Mexican or Central American indigenous groups, whereas the others 
had marriages with a simple ritual only, and often had a “marriage” as a gradual 
process rather than a single event. 
 The data presented in Table  2.1 , however, essentially refer to smaller and more 
isolated indigenous populations who had maintained their lifestyles until the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, and as a consequence they constitute a selective sam-
ple. At the time of the European conquests during the sixteenth century also large 
states existed (e.g. Aztec, Maya, Inca), which were both highly centralized and 
“ritualized”. These features facilitated the conversion to Christianity, and hence the 
adoption of a monogamous Christian marriage. By contrast, nomadic tribes and 
small indigenous populations in isolated places such as mountain canyons or the 
forest could maintain their traditions much longer and resist both, economic and 
administrative control from the center and the adoption of Christianity. These duali-
ties help to explain the diverging historical tracks followed by indigenous popula-
tions. Furthermore, also the “mestization” of large numbers of them and the 
concentration of these populations in larger villages or around agricultural enter-
prises fostered conversion to Catholicism and the adoption of the Christian marriage 
pattern. 
 The story for the  New World black and mixed populations is of course very dif-
ferent, since these populations were imported as slaves. As such they had to undergo 
the rules set by their European masters, or, when freed or eloped, they had to “rein-
vent” their own rules. When still in slavery, marriages and even unions were not 
encouraged by the white masters, given the lower labor productivity of pregnant 
women and mothers. And for as long as new imports remained cheap, there was 
little interest on the part of the owners in the natural growth of the estates’ slave 
population. The “reinvented” family patterns among eloped or freed black popula-
tions were often believed to be “African”, but in reality there are no instances where 
the distinct West African kinship patterns and concomitant patterns of social orga-
nization are reproduced (strict exogamy, widespread gerontocratic polygyny). 
Instead, there is a dominance of visiting unions, in which the woman only accepts a 
male partner for as long as he contributes fi nancially or in kind to the household 
expenditures and where the children of successive partners stay with their mother. 
Not surprisingly, diverging devolution is equally absent among the New World 
black and mixed populations reviewed by our two ethnographic samples. In this 
regard, they do follow the pattern of West-African non-Islamized populations. 
 The  white colonial settler population or the upper social class by contrast 
adhered to the principles of the European marriage (“Spanish marriage”, “Portuguese 
2 The Rise of Cohabitation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970–2011
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 nobres marriage”) being monogamous, based on diverging devolution and hence 
with social class as well as preferred families endogamy. However, this European 
pattern was complemented with rather widespread concubinage, either with lower 
social class women or slaves (see for instance Borges  1985 and Beierle  1999 ; for the 
Bahia colonial upper class in Brazil and Twinam  1999 ; for several Spanish speaking 
populations). Children from such unions in Brazil could easily be legitimized by 
their fathers via a simple notary act (Borges  1985 ). 
 As indicated, the data of Table  2.1 should of course be taken as an illustration, 
and not as an exhaustive classifi cation of Latin American ethnic populations. But, in 
our opinion, they clearly demonstrate that “marriage” as Eurasian societies know it, 
initially must have been a fairly irrelevant construct to both indigenous and New 
World black populations, and subsequently, just an ideal or a formal marker of 
social success. 
 So far, we have mainly dealt with the historical roots of the diverse patterns of 
union formation. But more needs to be said about the infl uence of institutional fac-
tors and immigration. 
 The Catholic church and the states generally tended to favor the “European” 
marriage pattern, but originally with quite some ambiguity. First, the Catholic 
clergy, and especially those in more distant parishes, did not observe the celibacy 
requirement that strictly. Second, many Christian and pre-Colombian practices were 
merged into highly syncretic devotions. The promotion of the Christian marriage 
was mainly the work of the religious orders (Franciscans, Augustinians, Dominicans, 
and until the end of the eighteenth century also the Jesuits). At present, that promo-
tion is vigorously carried out by the new Evangelical churches which have been 
springing up all over the continent since the 1950s, and most visibly in Brazil and 
Peru. 
 Also the role of the various states is often highly ambiguous. Generally, states 
copied the European legislations of the colonizing nations and hence “offi cially” 
promoted the classic European marriage, but more often than not this was accompa-
nied by amendments that involved the recognition of consensual unions as a form of 
common law marriage and also of equal inheritance rights for children born in such 
unions. In Brazil, for instance, Portuguese law had already spelled out two types of 
family regulations as early as the sixteenth century (Philippine Code of 1603), 
namely laws pertaining to the property of notables ( nobres ) who married in church 
and transmitted signifi cant property, and laws pertaining to the countryfolk ( peões ) 
who did not necessarily marry and continued to live in consensual unions (Borges 
 1985 ). Furthermore, it should also be stressed that many central governments were 
often far too weak to implement any consistent policy in favor of the European mar-
riage pattern. Add to that the remoteness of many settlements and the lack of interest 
of local administrations to enforce the centrally enacted legislation. 
 However, as pointed out by Quilodrán ( 1999 ), it would be a major simplifi cation 
to assume that this “old cohabitation” was a uniform trait in Latin American coun-
tries. Quite the opposite is true. In many areas, late nineteenth century and twentieth 
century mass European immigration (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, German) to the 
emerging urban and industrial centers of the continent reintroduced the typical 
A. Esteve et al.
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Western European marriage pattern with monogamy, highly institutionally regu-
lated marriage, condemnation of illegitimacy and low divorce. As a consequence, 
the European model was reinforced to a considerable extent and became part and 
parcel of the urban process of  embourgeoisement . It is interesting to note that even 
the Communist party in Cuba initially wanted to promote classic European-style 
marriages. To this end, they considered erecting “marriage palaces” and organizing 
group marriages, so that also poorer people would be able to celebrate the event 
“with all the luxuries of a bourgeois wedding” (Martínez-Allier  1989 : 140). 
 The combination of the various factors just outlined not only caused the inci-
dence of cohabitation to vary widely geographically and in function of the ethnic 
mix, but also produced the emergence of a marked gradient by educational level and 
social class: the higher the level of education, the lower the incidence of cohabita-
tion and the higher that of marriage. This negative cohabitation-education gradient 
is obviously essentially the result of historical developments and long term forces, 
and, as we shall illustrate shortly, found in every single one of the countries studied 
here. The gradient is not the outcome of a particular economic crisis or decade of 
stagnation (e.g. the 1980s and early 1990s). 
3  The Latin American Cohabitation Boom: The National 
Trends 
 Latin American censuses have historically provided an explicit category for consen-
sual unions ( uniones libres, uniones consensuales ). The examination of the ques-
tionnaires of all Latin American and Caribbean censuses conducted between 
the1960s and 2000s reveals that in the vast majority of them cohabitants could be 
explicitly indentifi ed either through the variables ‘marital status’ (dominant 
approach) or ‘union status’ (quite common in Caribbean countries) or through a 
direct question (e.g. Brazil and recently in Argentina and Surinam). A methodologi-
cal problem emerges, however, when individuals that cohabited in the past and were 
no longer in union at the time of the census report themselves as singles (Esteve 
et al.  2011 ). This clearly exaggerates the proportion of singles and affects the ratio 
between married and cohabitating couples as we observe ages that are increasingly 
distant from those in which union formation was more intense. To minimize bias, 
our analysis focuses on young ages, mainly 25–29. 1 However, cohabitation may not 
be an enduring state and subsequent transitions to marriage are often the rule. In 
such circumstances, those with early entries into a partnership may already be in the 
process of moving from cohabitation into marriage at ages 25–29, whereas those 
1 Age at union formation has remained remarkably stable in Latin America during the last few 
decades. This implies a process in which young cohorts substitute more and more non-marital 
cohabitation for marriage without modifying substantially the timing of union formation. Since we 
observe over time similar proportions of individuals in union by age, the rise of cohabitation 
among individuals aged 25–29 cannot be explained by changes in the timing of union formation. 
2 The Rise of Cohabitation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970–2011
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with later partnering, such as the more educated, may still be in the process of mov-
ing from singlehood to cohabitation (Ni Brolchain and Beaujouan  2013 ). In that 
instance there would be a bias in favor of marriage for the less educated and in favor 
of cohabitation for those with longer educational careers. In the Latin American set-
ting there is simply no increase in the proportions married in  any of the education 
groups at  any age, and hence this timing effect of entry into a partnership barely 
affects the outcomes that will be described. This is furthermore confi rmed by 
inspecting the share of cohabitation in the next age group 30–34 and by following 
men aged 25–29 and 30–34 as well. In other words, the “quantum” effect (i.e. the 
sheer size of the ubiquitous rise in cohabitation) by far outweighs any tempo-related 
distortion. 
 Several researchers (e.g. Ruiz Salguero and Rodríguez Vignoli  2011 ; Rosero 
Bixby et al.  2009 ; López-Ruiz et al.  2008 ; Rodríguez Vignoli  2005 ; García and 
Rojas  2002 ) have used census data to explore cohabitation patterns in Latin America. 
Some of them did so on the basis of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) that have been collected and harmonized at the University of Minnesota 
Population Studies Center (Minnesota Population Center  2014 ). Also, estimates of 
the share of consensual unions among all unions were made by the US Census 
Bureau ( 2004 ) for the censuses of the 1950s and 1960s in a more limited number of 
countries. 
 Previous research reveals a remarkable rise of the share of consensual unions 
among all unions, and this rise most probably already starts during the 1960s in a 
number of countries (Fussell and Palloni  2004 ), involving both countries with an 
initially very low incidence of cohabitation and countries with higher levels. The 
early cohabitation shares reported by Fussell and Palloni pertain to the unions of 
women aged 20–29. These data indicate that Argentina (5.8 % cohabitation of all 
unions in 1950), Uruguay (5.7 % in 1960), Chile (3.0 % in 1970) and Brazil (5.1 % 
in 1960) belong to the former category. Peru (20.9 % in 1960) and Colombia (13.5 % 
in 1960) are typical examples of the latter group with later rises. However, countries 
with pre-existing high levels of what we have called “old cohabitation” did not wit-
ness the onset of such a trend until much later. Examples thereof are Guatemala 
(56.1 % in 1950) or Venezuela (29.7 % in 1950), the Dominican Republic (44.4 % in 
1960) or El Salvador (34.2 % in 1960). 
 The results that will be reported from here onward stem from the extensive anal-
ysis of the harmonized Latin American census microdata samples available at 
IPUMS international (Minnesota Population Center  2014 ).This analysis uses as 
many census rounds between 1970 and 2010 as possible (see Appendix Table  2.8 ). 
Consequently, with the exception of few areas, the time series generally capture the 
initial rises of the share of cohabitation. The results are shown in Table  2.2 for 24 
countries, and for men and women aged 25–29 and 30–34 respectively.
 The data in Table  2.2 not only document the marked heterogeneity of Latin 
American countries at the onset, but also the acceleration in an already upward trend 
during the 1990s. There are essentially two groups of countries, i.e. countries that 
had a strong tradition of marriage with little cohabitation to start with, and countries 
in which cohabitation was more widespread and had stronger historical roots. 
A. Esteve et al.
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 During the early 1960s (1970 census round) the share of cohabitation among all 
men or women 25–29 in a union varied between about 5 and 20 % in countries with 
low levels of “old cohabitation”, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay. However, a genuine cohabitation boom 
took place during the 1990s that drove up these percentages to levels between 25 
and 70 %. The 1990s were particularly signifi cant for Colombia where the share of 
cohabitation for women 25–29 jumps from about 20 % in 1973 to almost 50 in 1993 
and over 65 in 2005. Less spectacular, but equally noteworthy are the large incre-
ments in Argentina and Brazil where the cohabitation shares initially remained 
fairly stable around 15 %, but then increased during the 1990s by about 30 percent-
age points compared to the 1970 fi gure. Increments over that period of about 20 
percentage points are witnessed in Costa Rica and Chile. But the “late starters” are 
Mexico, Puerto Rico, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay with only modest rises till 2000. 
 The fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century is characterized by several further 
spectacular rises in the initially “low” group of countries. The latest census fi gures 
for the 2010 round indicate that the share of cohabitation passed the 50 % threshold 
in Brazil and Costa Rica, and that even the 60 % mark was amply passed in 
Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay. For Puerto Rico and Chile we have no 2010 
data, but Mexico, the other late starter, was clearly catching up and coming close to 
a cohabitation share of 40 %. 
 Among the countries with about 30 % or more cohabitors among women or men 
25–29 in unions in the 1970s census round, i.e. among those with sizeable catego-
ries of “old cohabitation”, there are also remarkable rises that took place during the 
last two decades. Clear examples thereof are the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Peru and even Panama which had the highest levels to start with in 1970. 
 For the remaining countries in Table  2.2 we have only one or two points of mea-
surement, but according to the 2000 census round, most of them had a cohabitation 
share in excess of 35 % and up to about 60 % (highest: Cuba, Jamaica, Honduras, 
Nicaragua). Furthermore it should be noticed that several Central American coun-
tries tend to exhibit a status quo, but at high levels. This holds for Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, but as indicated above, not for Costa Rica and Panama 
where the upward trend was continued. 
 Judging from the most recent 2000 or 2010 fi gures, cohabitation has overtaken 
marriage among men 25–29 in 16 of the 23 countries (no data for men in Trinidad 
and Tobago), and among women 25–29 in 13 of the 24 countries considered here. 
In 1970 there was only one case (Panama) among 12 countries with a cohabitation 
share in excess of 50 %, and in 1980 there were only 2 (Dominican Republic and 
Panama) among 13 countries. 
 Finally, it should also be noted that the fi gures for the next age group, i.e. 30–34, 
are roughly 10–15 percentage points lower. There are two competing explanations 
for this feature. First, the drop off could be due to the post-cohabitation transition 
into marriage, and this would be indicative of cohabitation being only a transient 
state as in several European countries. Alternatively, it can be explained by a cohort 
effect with the older generation having experienced less cohabitation when they 
were in their late twenties. This explanation is particularly likely in periods of rapid 
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 Table 2.2  Percent cohabiting among all persons in a union (married + cohabiting), 25–34, by sex 
and census round, Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970–2010 
 25–29  30–34 
 1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
 Men 
  Argentina  13.1  14.9  25.9  48.7  72.2  10.9  12.2  20.9  33.2  54.6 
  Belize  –  –  –  44.9  –  –  –  –  36.9  – 
  Bolivia  –  –  –  41.1  –  –  –  –  28.6  – 
  Brazil  7.2  13.3  25.2  45.5  57.3  6.5  11.3  19.5  35.4  47.3 
  Chile  4.4  6.2  12.1  29.3  –  4.2  5.8  9.6  20.4  - 
  Colombia  20.3  36.4  54.8  73.0  –  18.6  30.5  46.1  62.1  - 
  Costa Rica  17.0  20.1  –  38.1  56.0  15.3  18.0  -  29.8  42.4 
  Cuba  –  –  –  62.1  –  –  –  –  54.6  - 
  Dominican 
Rep. 
 –  64.5  –  73.1  83.3  –  60.5  –  66.3  76.4 
  Ecuador  27.2  29.9  31.3  41.5  52.9  24.8  27.6  28.6  36.4  44.5 
  El Salvador  –  –  57.7  –  60.8  –  –  50.3  –  49.5 
  Guatemala  –  –  39.1  39.3  –  –  –  36.1  34.4  – 
  Guyana  –  –  –  50.8  –  –  –  –  46.3  – 
  Honduras  –  –  –  60.7  –  –  –  –  53.4  – 
  Jamaica  –  –  –  69.9  –  –  –  58.4  – 
  Mexico  16.6  –  16.2  25.0  41.7  14.6  –  12.6  19.6  30.8 
  Nicaragua  44.8  –  60.1  61.0  –  39.3  –  51.8  52.4  – 
  Panama  58.4  54.9  58.8  70.2  79.7  57.5  52.4  50.5  58.3  68.2 
  Paraguay  –  28.7  31.1  47.4  –  –  21.7  25.85  39.59  – 
  Peru  –  32.7  50.7  –  76.6  –  23.2  37.5  –  62.7 
  Puerto Rico  8.1  6.2  13.5  –  –  8.0  5.1  11.0  –  – 
  Trinidad & 
Tob. 
 –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
  Uruguay  10.0  14.7  –  27.7  77.1  9.0  13.4  –  20.7  61.2 
  Venezuela  30.6  34.1  38.7  56.4  –  30.6  32.8  35.3  47.7  – 
 Women 
  Argentina  11.1  13.0  22.5  41.3  65.5  10.1  11.5  19.5  28.7  48.1 
  Belize  –  –  –  41.1  –  –  –  –  35.4  – 
  Bolivia  –  –  –  34.7  –  –  –  –  23.4  – 
  Brazil  7.6  13.0  22.2  39.3  51.1  7.1  11.7  19.0  31.6  43.5 
  Chile  4.6  6.7  11.4  24.6  –  4.6  6.5  11.0  18.3  – 
  Colombia  19.7  33.2  49.2  65.6  –  18.2  28.4  42.4  56.6  – 
  Costa Rica  16.8  19.4  –  32.6  48.5  16.1  17.3  –  26.3  37.7 
  Cuba  –  –  –  55.8  –  –  –  –  50.0  – 
  Dominican 
Rep 
 –  60.8  –  67.6  78.4  –  55.2  –  61.1  71.3 
  Ecuador  27.0  29.4  30.1  37.4  47.4  25.3  26.8  27.5  32.5  40.1 
  El Salvador  –  –  53.1  –  53.7  –  –  48.1  –  44.4 
(continued)
A. Esteve et al.
35
Table 2.2 (continued)
 25–29  30–34 
 1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
  Guatemala  –  –  37.2  37.1  –  –  –  35.3  33.4  – 
  Guyana  –  –  –  47.23  –  –  –  –  42.92  – 
  Honduras  –  –  –  55.5  –  –  –  –  49.7  – 
  Jamaica  –  –  –  61.3  –  –  –  –  51.8  – 
  Mexico  15.3  –  15.2  22.7  37.1  14.2  –  12.5  18.6  28.1 
  Nicaragua  42.8  –  54.9  55.5  –  36.0  –  49.6  49.4  – 
  Panama  58.9  52.3  53.2  62.5  73.9  53.8  51.0  49.3  54.1  62.6 
  Paraguay  –  20.6  27.5  36.5  –  –  19.4  23.3  31.0  – 
  Peru  –  29.2  43.1  –  69.8  –  21.9  31.9  –  56.1 
  Puerto Rico  8.5  5.3  12.0  –  –  6.6  4.7  10.1  –  – 
  Trinidad & 
Tob. 
 –  –  24.9  31.9  37.6  –  –  22.4  25.4  27.8 
  Uruguay  9.6  14.1  –  23.6  70.7  7.8  13.3  –  18.8  53.7 
  Venezuela  30.8  32.6  36.9  51.6  –  31.2  32.6  34.9  45.2  – 
 Notes : Uruguay: results of the Extended National Surveys of Homes of 2006: Males 25–29 
(60.7 %); M 30–34 (44.3 %); Females 25–29 (53.8 %); F 30–34 (36.9 %) 
 Guatemala: results of the Survey of Employment and Income of 2012: Males 25–29 (37.9 %); M 
30–34 (37.4 %); Females 25–29 (39.3 %); F 30–34 (35.2 %) 
 Trinidad and Tobago only provides union status for women. Census 2011 includes visiting unions 
as consensual unions 
 Source : Authors’ tabulations based on census samples from IPUMS-International and National 
Statistical Offi ces 
change. In this instance cohort profi les should be layered horizontally rather than 
dropping off with age, meaning that each generation climbs a step further upward 
with respect to the incidence of cohabitation. This would, furthermore be indicative 
of cohabitation being a much more permanent state over the life cycle of individu-
als. Note, however, that such stability of cohabitation over age and time does not 
imply stability with the same partner. 
 The availability of several successive censuses permits the reconstruction of the 
cohort profi les stretching over the entire adult life span. It should be noted, however, 
that this is a reconstruction at the macro level, and that no individual transitions are 
recorded (a life table analysis of individual cohabitation durations would then be 
needed). Nevertheless, the cohort profi les are still very instructive, as can be seen 
from the reconstructions for Brazil and Mexico in Fig.  2.1 .
 The Brazilian age distributions of the share of cohabitants among all partnered 
women are dramatically moving up at  all ages during the window of observation 
between 1960 and 2010. For all cohorts up to the one born in 1980, this results in 
fl at rather than downward slopes of cohort profi les starting at age 20, and the gap 
between the successive generations also widens with the arrival of the younger ones 
born between 1960 and 1980. All of this is illustrative of a very clear generation 
driven pattern of social change, with cohabitation being a much more enduring state 
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 Fig. 2.1  Age distributions of the share of cohabitation for all women in a union and corresponding 
cohort profi les (C.). Brazil and Mexico, 1960–2010 
 Source : Authors’ elaboration based on census samples from IPUMS-International 
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over long periods in the life cycle. In other words, cohabitation is not just a matter 
of a short spell of partnership trial(s) but more like a marriage substitute. The 
slightly upward slopes for the older cohorts may also be indicative of older women 
moving into cohabitation following a marriage interruption due to divorce or wid-
owhood. The cohort born in 1980, by contrast, shows the downward slope which is 
normally associated with greater fractions moving from cohabitation to marriage. 
For this younger Brazilian cohort, which starts at a much higher level of cohabita-
tion in their early twenties than their predecessors, there may still be some shift 
associated with a pattern of “trial marriage” going on. 
 The Mexican data for the earlier censuses are based on a one percent sample 
only, which explains their bumpier patterns. This, however, does not affect the basic 
interpretation of what happened. Firstly, Mexico’s later take-off is very clearly in 
evidence with the initial cohort lines being fairly undifferentiated. The big change 
comes between 2000 and 2010, when the share of cohabitation increases for all 
ages, including the older ones. This not only means that the later cohorts born after 
1970 become more differentiated, but also that the cohorts born in the 1970s have 
increasing rather than decreasing percentages cohabiting after the age of 25. 
Secondly, the same feature is found as for the youngest cohort in Brazil: a down-
ward profi le between age 20 and 30. Evidently, also in Mexico, as many more 
younger women initiate a partnership via cohabitation, a larger segment of them 
coverts their consensual union into a marriage. However, this movement among the 
youngest cohort does not at all prevent them from reaching higher levels of cohabi-
tation by age 30. 
4  The Education Gradient 
 We have already pointed out that the negative cross-sectional gradient of cohabita-
tion with rising female education is a historical refl ection of ethnic and social class 
differentials in Latin American and Caribbean countries. This negative slope is 
found in  all countries considered here, and as the data of Fig.  2.2 indicate, this was 
already clearly in evidence prior to the post-1970 cohabitation boom.
 Taken individually, each of the negative gradients in Fig.  2.2 could be interpreted 
as the manifestation of the “pattern of disadvantage”. However, given the often 
spectacular rises since the 1970s, this interpretation would fall considerably short of 
accurately representing the situation. In fact, in  all countries and in  all education 
groups there is such an increase in the share of cohabitation. This obviously includes 
sometimes dramatic catching up among women with completed secondary and 
completed university educations. Such increases at the top educational layers obvi-
ously cannot be taken as a manifestation of a “pattern of disadvantage”. Clearly, 
there is a substantial amount of “new cohabitation” that developed on top of the 
historical “old cohabitation” during the last four decades. 
 There are, however, substantial differences among the countries represented in 
Fig.  2.2 Brazil, for instance, is the only country in which the largest rise of the share 
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 Fig. 2.2  Share of cohabitation among all unions of women 25–29 by level of completed educa-
tion, country and census round ( Source : Authors’ elaboration based on census samples from 
IPUMS-International and National Statistical Offi ces) 
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of cohabitation of partnered women 25–29 is still to be found among women with 
incomplete primary education. Over the 40 years span, i.e. from 1970 to 2010, 
Brazilian women with secondary and higher education are the more reluctant ones 
to swap marriage for cohabitation. This does, however, not stop such women to 
increase their cohabitation share from virtually zero in 1970 to some 35 % in 2010. 
 Venezuela comes closest to the Brazilian pattern, but the largest increment is 
found among women with completed primary education. Also in this country, the 
catching up of cohabitation among women with completed secondary or higher 
education is modest, and of the order of 20 percentage points over three decades. 
 The next group of countries is made up of cases in which the increments are 
roughly of equal importance in all four education groups. This group comprises 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico. These are all countries with overall low 
levels of cohabitation to start with, but with an original “pattern of disadvantage”. 
Given similar increments in all groups, this negative gradient is maintained through-
out. The Colombian pattern of change over three decades is also quite evenly spread 
over the various education categories, but the successive increments are much larger 
than in the previous countries. Moreover, the growth is most pronounced in the 
middle education categories. Similarly, also Ecuador provides an example with the 
largest increment for women with completed secondary education, but the overall 
rise is more modest than in neighboring Colombia. In the other Andean country, 
Peru, the current pattern of 2007 has become almost fl at for the fi rst three education 
groups at no less than 70 % cohabiting. Women 25–29 with completed tertiary edu-
cation have crossed the 50 % mark, which was about the level for Peruvian women 
with no more than primary education in 1993. 
 The case of Uruguay merits attention in its own right. In 1975, the country also 
exhibited the classic negative gradient with education, but at low levels for all 
groups, i.e. not exceeding 20 %. During the next 20 years, the growth was modest 
and very even. But between 1996 and 2010, a truly spectacular shift occurred from 
marriage to cohabitation, resulting in an almost fl at gradient located at 70 % cohabi-
tation and only 30 % marriage for women 25–29. Among women with completed 
tertiary education, Uruguay now has the highest percentage cohabiting women 
25–29 of all the countries considered here, including the ones with long histories of 
traditional cohabitation. 
 The last group of countries is composed of those with long traditions of cohabita-
tion especially among the less educated social classes. These countries are typically 
in Central America or the Caribbean: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua 
and Panama. In all four countries the original gradient, measured as of 1970, was 
very steep, with a share of cohabitation in the 50–90 % range for the lowest educa-
tion group, and a share not exceeding 12 % for their small group of women with 
completed university education. In all instances, women with completed secondary 
education or more have been catching up. In El Salvador, this gain was very modest. 
 Fig. 2.2 (continued)  Notes :  < Prim Less than Primary Completed,  Prim Primary Completed,  Sec 
Secondary Completed,  Uni University Completed. Some college is included in university com-
pleted in Colombia 1993.There is no category for less than primary in Jamaica 2001. We do not 
have data on educational attainment for Guatemala 1994, Paraguay 1982–1992 and Peru 1981 
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In Nicaragua the increment among the middle education groups is already much 
more pronounced, but this rise occurred essentially between 1971 and 1995, and not 
so much thereafter. The other two countries in this group with a long cohabitation 
tradition, i.e. the Dominican Republic and Panama, provide examples of further 
increments above the initial 70–80 % cohabitation among the least educated women 
25–29. This is remarkable given the high levels to start with. However, even more 
striking is the very substantial catching up in all the other education categories. 
University educated women 25–29 in both Panama and the Dominican Republic 
now have an equal 50–50 share of cohabitation and marriage, whereas the middle 
categories have reached percentages between 70 and 90, i.e. nearly as high as those 
in the lowest education group. 
 The upward shifts of the share of cohabitation during the last three or four 
decades have occurred in tandem with very considerable improvements in educa-
tion among women in these countries. This can be gleaned from the data in Table 
 2.3 representing the percentages of all women 25–29 who have completed either 
 Table 2.3  Percentages of women 25–29 with completed primary and completed secondary 
education by country and census round 
 Completed primary or more  Completed secondary or more 
 Women  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010 
 Argentina  68.5  79.1  89.4  93.7  94.2  6.6  15.9  27.5  53.2  60.1 
 Belize  –  -  –  70.2  –  –  –  –  30.0  – 
 Bolivia  27.5  63.8  72.2  –  –  7.9  24.6  37.9  – 
 Brazil  14.6  33.9  53.1  62.9  84.0  7.3  17.8  27.3  34.2  56.4 
 Chile  60.3  79.8  88.8  94.3  –  12.7  30.1  41.8  55.9  – 
 Colombia  41.6  68.8  77.3  86.0  –  7.5  25.4  31.6  55.8  – 
 Costa Rica  50.6  78.9  –  84.6  89.4  8.2  15.2  –  31.6  48.3 
 Cuba  –  –  –  98.8  –  –  –  –  59.0  – 
 Dominican Republic  –  58.3  –  74.6  85.2  –  22.9  –  45.0  56.5 
 Ecuador  38.9  61.5  76.7  80.2  88.8  8.5  20.9  33.9  37.6  50.5 
 El Salvador  –  54.0  –  –  65.8  –  22.7  –  30.8  – 
 Guatemala  –  –  –  42.0  –  –  –  –  16.2  – 
 Honduras  –  –  –  85.8  –  –  –  –  30.3  – 
 Jamaica  –  –  –  98.0  –  –  –  –  82.0  – 
 Mexico  29.2  –  70.2  85.9  90.8  2.6  –  22.6  30.6  41.2 
 Nicaragua  19.5  –  54.2  60.8  –  4.7  –  19.3  28.6  – 
 Panama  56.3  73.9  86.4  88.3  91.4  13.8  28.7  44.2  49.6  59.8 
 Paraguay  –  –  –  76.6  –  –  –  –  31.4  – 
 Peru  –  –  70.0  –  85.6  –  –  49.2  –  65.1 
 Puerto Rico  79.1  91.7  97.3  98.5  40.7  65.6  78.7  85.1 
 Trinidad & Tobago  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
 Uruguay  72.7  89.0  91.5  96.2  21.6  33.4  36.9  41.9 
 Venezuela  45.8  70.2  79.5  87.7  –  3.2  13.4  18.7  27.4  – 
 Source: Authors’ tabulations based on census samples from IPUMS-International and National 
Statistical Offi ces 
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full primary or full secondary education. The point here of course is that the group 
of women with less than complete primary education have become more marginal, 
and that women with full primary education of today basically belong to the same 
social strata as those with no or incomplete primary education three decades ago.
 Considering these major improvements in educational levels described in Table 
 2.3 in tandem with a negative education gradient for the prevalence of cohabitation, 
one would project declining overall proportions cohabiting and rising proportions 
being married. Of course, just the opposite has happened, and quite dramatically so. 
In other words, the effect of a changing educational composition of the population 
did not at all work out in the expected direction. Hence, all the changes in cohabita-
tion in Latin America are due to individual changes, and not at all due to the educa-
tional composition change. 
 Now that an explanation based on such a composition shift can be discarded 
completely, we need to explore other avenues to account for the spectacular rises in 
cohabitation in all these countries, regions and social strata. 
5  Explaining the Rise in Cohabitation 
 A useful framework for the analysis of any new form of behavior is the “ready, will-
ing and able” (RWA) one used by Coale ( 1973 ) to interpret the historical European 
fertility transition, and elaborated by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft ( 2001 ) to accom-
modate heterogeneity and the time dimension. The “Readiness” condition states 
that the new form of behavior must have an economic or psychological advantage, 
and hence refers to the cost-benefi t calculus of a particular action compared to its 
alternatives. The “Willingness” condition, by contrast, refers to the religious and/or 
ethical legitimacy of the new form of behavior. And the “Ability” condition states 
that there must be technical and legal means available which permit the realization 
of that “innovation”. Note, however, that the RWA-conditions must be met  jointly 
before a transition to a new form will take place. It suffi ces for one condition not 
being met or lagging for the whole process of change coming to a halt. 
 In the instance of cohabitation, a number of economic advantages are easily 
identifi ed. First, compared to legal marriage, cohabitation is an “easy in, easy out” 
solution. This implies, more specifi cally, (i) that considerable costs are saved by 
avoiding more elaborate marriage ceremonies, (ii) that parents and relatives or 
friends are presented with the outcome of individual partner choice as a  fait accom-
pli , and (iii) that the exit costs from cohabitation, both fi nancial and psychological, 
are considerably lower than in the case of a legal divorce. In other words, cohabita-
tion is the quicker and cheaper road to both sexual partnership and economies of 
scale. And in many instances, such shorter term advantages may indeed weigh up 
against the main advantage of marriage, being a fi rmer longer term commitment. 
 In addition to these general economic advantages, the rise in cohabitation can 
also be a response to the economic downturns of the 1980s and the slow recovery of 
the 1990s. Potential couples in these instances could postpone entry into a union of 
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any type. Alternatively they could opt for the easier and cheaper version, and 
 therefore choose cohabitation. Furthermore, the transition from cohabitation to 
marriage could be delayed and even forgone as a result of unfavorable economic 
circumstances. The latter two instances would lead to a rise in the share of cohabita-
tion among all persons in a union. 
 Within the RWA framework, a basic change in the readiness condition, as 
described above, would not be suffi cient. Concomitant changes in the other two 
conditions are equally necessary. In the Latin American context, we would therefore 
expect to identify major cultural changes as well, particularly related to ethics and 
morality, thereby lifting the stigma on certain forms of behavior, including cohabi-
tation. Most likely, such changes are accompanied by further secularization and by 
changes in attitudes toward gender relations. 
 We address the readiness and willingness conditions in the next two sections. 
Discussion of the ability condition, which would require a detailed study of legal 
provisions and changes affecting the status of consensual unions, is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Suffi ce it to say that national differences in trends related to 
cohabitation can also be the result of differences or shifts in such legal and institu-
tional factors (cf. Vassallo  2011 ). 
5.1  Cohabitation as a Response to Economic Shocks 
 Latin America has been characterized by both widespread social and economic 
inequalities and turbulent macroeconomic performance. After a period of dictator-
ships, a number of Latin American countries “re-democratized”, but policies aimed 
at diminishing the large differentials in standards of living resulted in infl ation and 
outbursts of hyperinfl ation (Bittencourt  2012 ) Attempts at income redistribution 
during this populist phase were conducted through unfunded public defi cits, which 
led to massive infl ation, and ultimately to even greater inequality as the poor were 
affected more than the rich. In such instances the benefi ts of economic development 
realized before 1980 were often lost. 
 The timing, duration and severity of the periods of hyperinfl ation varied consid-
erably from country to country. Roughly speaking, we can identify two patterns. 
The fi rst was characterized by a very long period of infl ation, but at peak annual 
levels during the 1980s that were generally below 30 %. The second pattern is a 
short period of infl ation of such high intensity that money became worthless over-
night. Peak levels of 1000 % infl ation in a given year were common (Singh et al. 
 2005 ; Adsera and Menendez  2011 ). Obviously, the effect of such infl ation spikes is 
felt for many years, and in the Latin American case, well into the 1990s. Examples 
of long duration infl ation are Chile (already starting during the Allende presidency) 
and Colombia (Singh et al.  2005 : 4). Examples of virulent hyperinfl ation are Brazil 
(2950 % in1990), Argentina (3080 % in 1989), Peru (7490 % in 1990) and Bolivia 
(11750 % in 1985). Such fi gures provide ample reason to advance the thesis that 
economic conditions could have been primary causes of the rise of the share of 
cohabitation in Latin America. 
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 We mention three caveats regarding this explanation, however. As argued by 
Fussell and Palloni ( 2004 ) ages at fi rst union remained remarkably stable through-
out the second half of the twenthieth century and show a surprisingly low elasticity 
to such economic disturbances. The authors assert that economic conditions accel-
erated the fertility decline, but that, “ as it has been for many centuries, the marriage 
and kinship system in Latin America continues to provide a system of nonmonetary 
exchange that parallels rather than competes with market systems .” (p.1211). In 
their opinion, the nuptiality system would provide a buffer against economic hard-
ship, for both elites and the bulk of the population. But their research focuses on the 
stable ages at fi rst union, not on the shift from marriage to cohabitation. Viewed 
from the latter perspective, much more “internal” change took place within the nup-
tiality system, and it remains possible that the more turbulent 1980s and early 1990s 
are at least partially responsible for accelerating the shift from marriage to 
cohabitation. 
 Our second caveat concerns the timing of both features, infl ation and the rise of 
cohabitation. In two of the countries considered here, Brazil and Colombia, the larg-
est increase in percentages cohabiting occurred during the 1970s, well before the 
shocks of the 1980s. During that decade, these percentages cohabiting continued to 
grow, but in two different infl ation regimes. The Brazilian hyperinfl ation peak of 
almost 3000 % occurred in 1990, by which time the cohabitation share for women 
25–29 had nearly tripled from some 8 % to 22 % (see Table  2.1 ). In Colombia, the 
1980s infl ation peak was much lower, at 33 %, and also long-term infl ation was low 
by LatinAmerican standards – 16 % per annum for the second half of the twentieth 
century (Adsera and Menendez  2011 : 40). Yet Colombia experienced the most pro-
nounced increase in cohabitation, from around 20 % in 1970 to almost 50 % before 
the 1990 infl ation maximum. 
 The two countries with the largest increments in cohabitation in the 1980s are 
Argentina and Puerto Rico. The former saw a hyperinfl ation peak of over 3000 % in 
1989 and average annual infl ation rates for the 50 years prior to 2003 of 184 % (ibi-
dem). Puerto Rico, by contrast, experienced nothing comparable to Argentinean 
infl ation levels, yet still recorded a noticeable rise in cohabitation before 1990. The 
Chilean example is also worth noting. Chile had an early hyperinfl ation peak of 
about 500 % during the 1970s, and again a more modest rise in the 1980s. Yet, Chile 
does not have the steepest rise in cohabitation by the year 2000. Similarly, also 
Mexico had its take off phase of cohabitation during the 1990s, and not a decade 
earlier when it had its high infl ation regime. 
 The conclusion from these comparisons is the absence of a clear correlation 
between the timing and rise in cohabitation on the one hand, and the timing of infl a-
tion peaks or the overall rate of infl ation on the other. Admittedly, a more precise 
time-series analysis is not possible since annual cohabitation rates, unlike marriage 
rates, cannot be computed. The entry into a consensual union is by defi nition an 
unrecorded event. The most one can say is that infl ation and hyperinfl ation may 
have been general catalysts that strengthened the trend in the shift from marriage to 
cohabitation, but other causes must have been present as well. 
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 Our third caveat points even more strongly in that direction. During the fi rst 
decade of the twenty-fi rst century, infl ation rates in Latin American countries have 
fallen to much lower levels than during the 1980–1995 era, and yet, the upward 
trend in cohabitation has not abated. In fact, as the results for the 2010 census round 
indicate, the opposite holds to a striking degree in Uruguay, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Costa Rica and Mexico where a high rate of increase in cohabitation has been main-
tained (Table  2.1 ). Even Panama, which had the highest incidence of cohabitation 
throughout the entire study period, witnessed a further increase in cohabitation dur-
ing the fi rst decade of the new Century. Hence, it is now very clear from the 2010 
census round that the rise in cohabitation is a fundamental systemic alteration and 
not merely a reaction to economic shocks. 
5.2  Lifting the Stigma: Cohabitation and Ideational Change 
 As the RWA-framework posits, the switch to larger shares of cohabitation in all 
strata of the population would not have occurred had a major stigma against cohabi-
tation persisted. Hence, the “willingness” condition must have changed in the direc-
tion of greater tolerance. Responses to the World Values Surveys indeed suggest the 
occurrence of a major change in crucial features of the ideational domain. We now 
turn to that evidence. 
 The European (EVS) and World Values Studies (WVS) have a long tradition 
often going back to the 1980s to measure major ethical, religious, social and politi-
cal dimensions of the cultural system. Most Latin American countries have only one 
wave of the WVS, and a single cross-section is of course inadequate for our pur-
poses. Moreover, unlike the EVS, the WVS-surveys measure current cohabitation 
only (“living as married”) but fails to catch the “ever cohabited” state, thereby con-
founding married persons with and without cohabitation experience. 2 
 For three Latin American countries with large shares of post-1960s “new” 
cohabitation we can at least follow the trend over time with an interval of 15 years. 
Argentina and Brazil had WVS waves in 1991 and 2006, and Chile in 1990 and 
2006, with a subset of questions being repeated across the two surveys. Several of 
these questions are of particular relevance for our purposes since they shed light on 
the changes occurring in the various age groups in values pertaining to ethics, secu-
larization and gender relations. 
 In Table  2.4 we have brought together the WVS results for the 1990–1991 and 
2006 waves with respect to fi ve ethical issues. For three broad age groups and both 
sexes we have measured the percentages that consider as inadmissible (“never justi-
fi ed”) the following actions: divorce, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia and 
2  That problem is particularly important for countries where much cohabitation is of the “new” 
type. These countries are more similar to the European ones, for which the insertion of the “ever 
cohabited” question in the EVS revealed very stark contrasts in values orientations between those 
who ever and never cohabited (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn  2004 ). 
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 Table 2.4  Attitudinal changes in ethical issues in three Latin American countries, by age and sex, 
1990–2006 
 Men  Women 
 ≤29 
 30–
49  50+  Total  N  ≤29 
 30–
49  50+  Total  N 
 Never justifi ed: Euthanasia 
  Argentina  1991  43.3  53.4  62.0  53.6  453  46.8  57.1  72.2  59.9  491 
 2006  36.3  38.2  52.0  42.1  382  36.2  39.1  58.9  45.2  434 
  Chile  1990  51.9  62.6  72.8  61.0  700  58.7  65.2  75.9  65.7  760 
 2006  25.7  34.1  48.9  36.7  411  35.1  33.0  50.0  39.4  510 
  Brazil  1991  58.2  59.2  73.2  62.0  811  60.8  70.4  79.2  68.6  869 
 2006  41.4  48.8  47.1  46.0  611  50.4  50.3  56.3  51.9  855 
 Never justifi ed: Homosexuality 
  Argentina  1991  52.7  58.8  70.4  61.2  448  42.3  56.4  73.9  59.0  505 
 2006  24.8  27.5  50.4  33.5  400  16.7  23.9  40.5  27.6  449 
  Chile  1990  71.8  75.6  83.6  76.1  703  71.4  77.5  86.2  77.6  774 
 2006  17.5  24.6  36.0  26.4  425  13.9  21.6  32.7  23.2  512 
  Brazil  1991  74.7  70.1  84.9  75.2  888  57.6  62.3  76.6  63.6  867 
 2006  35.8  32.5  38.7  35.3  606  22.6  27.6  37.4  28.6  838 
 Never justifi ed: Abortion 
  Argentina  1991  45.0  39.1  50.0  44.6  446  38.3  39.9  58.2  45.9  518 
 2006  49.6  50.0  64.7  54.7  430  44.0  53.8  68.2  56.1  490 
  Chile  1990  69.3  76.7  78.8  74.5  709  73.8  74.6  82.0  76.2  783 
 2006  43.0  53.7  63.8  54.2  432  49.6  53.6  72.1  58.9  533 
  Brazil  1991  59.6  59.0  67.5  61.1  890  61.7  68.5  74.9  67.3  887 
 2006  55.8  65.0  62.7  61.5  613  59.5  65.6  68.5  64.5  866 
 Never justifi ed: Divorce 
  Argentina  1991  20.0  20.8  31.9  24.5  461  14.1  23.2  30.6  23.4  518 
 2006  13.5  16.8  24.8  18.3  427  9.9  13.4  21.2  15.2  499 
  Chile  1990  36.4  49.5  50.3  44.8  707  42.0  44.3  58.8  47.3  780 
 2006  15.3  13.0  27.5  18.3  437  8.0  13.7  26.2  16.5  533 
  Brazil  1991  28.8  26.5  42.2  30.9  883  25.1  32.6  45.5  32.6  881 
 2006  14.6  21.1  22.0  19.3  612  12.6  20.5  26.0  19.6  859 
 Never justifi ed: Suicide 
  Argentina  1991  76.7  80.1  84.7  80.8  458  78.9  81.4  89.4  83.7  496 
 2006  58.5  46.1  79.4  71.6  408  69.5  74.4  85.0  76.8  462 
  Chile  1990  73.3  78.9  85.4  78.3  706  77.9  85.0  86.9  83.0  782 
 2006  48.2  60.0  65.7  58.7  426  52.6  61.5  75.0  63.8  517 
  Brazil  1991  83.1  89.3  92.0  87.5  890  85.5  92.7  92.5  89.9  888 
 2006  64.9  77.8  79.7  74.3  619  71.2  78.1  78.7  76.2  864 
 Source : Authors’ tabulations based on the 1990 and 2005 rounds of the World Values Survey data 
fi les 
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 suicide. With the exception of abortion in Argentina and Brazil, there are major 
changes in the direction of greater tolerance, and in many, there is just about a 
 landslide with reductions in the percentages “never justifi ed” of 10 to over 50 per-
centage points. Furthermore, these changes are often just as large among the older 
men and women (50+) as among the younger ones.
 By far the largest change noted in all three countries is the increase in tolerance 
toward homosexuality. The percentages who consider this as “never justifi ed” are 
halved or, as in Chile, have been reduced to a third or even a quarter of their 1990 
levels. In addition, a similar landslide can also be noted with respect to euthanasia. 
It equally occurs in the three countries, among both sexes and in all age groups. The 
change is again most pronounced in Chile. The reductions in percentages rejecting 
suicide and divorce are more modest compared to the massive change in the previ-
ous two items, but still very substantial and found in all age groups. And, as noted 
above, only the attitudes toward abortion show a mixed picture, with greater toler-
ance emerging in Chile, but not in Brazil and Argentina. 
 The latter exception notwithstanding, the data in Table  2.4 clearly indicate that a 
massive attitude change has taken place during the last two decades in favor of 
greater tolerance to forms of behavior or interventions that were largely tabooed 
before. This is obviously a cultural change which is entirely in line with what the 
theory of the “Second demographic transition” predicted (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
 2004 ; Lesthaeghe  2010 ). 
 The next set of items deals with secularization. The results for three sub- 
dimensions are given in Table  2.5 : church attendance, roles of the church, and indi-
vidual prayer. In all instances we measured the percentages who are at the secular 
end of the spectrum (no attendance, no prayer, church gives no answers). The results 
for the four items in Table  2.5 are very clear in the Chilean case: secularization has 
advanced to a remarkable degree and the trend is entirely in line with those described 
for the ethical issues in Table  2.5 . The evidence for Argentina is more attenuated. 
There is a major increase in non-attendance, but a much more modest increase in 
doubts about the church being capable of addressing family issues and in men 
reporting no moments of private prayer or mediation. By contrast the church’s 
capacity to address social problems seems not to have suffered in Argentina.
 The Brazilian outcome differs substantially from the previous two countries: the 
landslide toward greater ethical tolerance is not matched by advancing seculariza-
tion. Compared to the 1990 WVS-round, the 2006 one indicates falling percentages 
of persons never or very rarely attending church and falling percentages of persons 
doubting the role of the church. In fact, there is a clear rise in the proportions think-
ing that the church has a role to play in family matters. Only the percentages without 
moments of prayer and meditation have not changed in any signifi cant direction. 
Overall, the Brazilian lack of secularization is not in line with international trends.
 The results for four classic attitudinal items regarding family and gender are 
reported in Table  2.6 . The Chilean results are again the most striking and totally in 
line with the expected trend: a sharp increase for men and women of all ages who 
consider marriage an outdated institution, a parallel decrease of respondents consid-
ering that a child needs both a father and mother, a marked increase of persons dis-
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agreeing with the statement that being a housewife is just as fulfi lling (even among 
men), and a clear drop in the percentages stating that men should have priority when 
jobs are scarce. It should also be noted that the “feminist” shift is as pronounced 
among men as among women. 
 The Argentinean results again follow the Chilean pattern, but with more modera-
tion. The increase in the percentages considering marriage an outdated institution is 
just as large, but the Argentinean public is still more convinced that a child needs 
both a father and mother. There are also mixed signals regarding gender equality: 
there is the expected increase in persons who disagree with the role of housewife 
 Table 2.5  Attitudinal changes regarding religion and secularization in three Latin American 
countries, by age and sex, 1990-2006 
 Men  Women 
 ≤29 
 30–
49  50+  Total  N  ≤29 
 30–
49  50+  Total  N 
 Church attendance = never or less than once a year (%) 
  Argentina  1991  45.6  33.0  30.8  35.2  275  31.5  18.1  26.0  24.0  383 
 2006  73.3  58.3  65.6  65.5  467  46.5  36.8  25.0  34.9  535 
  Chile  1990  61.2  50.2  38.7  51.5  714  36.2  27.7  23.3  29.5  786 
 2006  76.1  55.9  55.7  61.1  425  47.9  39.2  23.8  36.2  542 
  Brazil  1991  46.0  45.8  35.4  43.5  892  34.3  31.5  16.0  29.1  890 
 2006  38.5  38.7  34.3  37.3  624  25.7  21.9  19.9  20.9  870 
 Church gives answers to social problems (% No) 
  Argentina  1991  72.6  72.3  56.8  66.8  407  68.3  62.6  48.7  55.4  448 
 2006  72.8  63.6  63.5  66.5  391  67.4  57.7  438  55.4  466 
  Chile  1990  29.3  25.1  15.6  22.8  663  32.0  22.9  21.1  25.7  723 
 2006  70.3  57.9  55.3  60.4  407  57.0  51.5  44.1  50.3  509 
  Brazil  1991  66.7  64.9  46.4  61.4  858  67.0  59.2  40.8  55.9  829 
 2006  64.4  50.2  48.8  54.3  606  56.2  54.4  44.6  52.4  842 
 Church gives answers to problems of the family (% No) 
  Argentina  1991  60.0  62.3  44.1  55.5  407  54.4  47.7  39.4  46.6  465 
 2006  63.1  58.2  58.1  59.7  397  60.8  58.6  44.3  53.9  475 
  Chile  1990  22.1  16.0  13.0  17.5  668  18.6  18.5  14.0  17.4  743 
 2006  59.6  47.9  43.9  49.9  413  51.9  42.9  38.7  43.7  517 
  Brazil  1991  55.0  55.3  45.9  53.0  860  54.1  41.4  32.1  44.3  844 
 2006  34.2  29.0  26.5  29.9  608  27.2  27.0  25.2  26.6  854 
 Moments of prayer or meditation (% No) 
  Argentina  1991  38.5  34.5  26.1  32.6  466  28.5  16.6  10.9  17.7  526 
 2006  44.6  34.2  32.7  37.0  462  23.6  14.4  6.6  14.1  532 
  Chile  1990  27.0  18.2  14.4  20.5  706  16.3  8.9  2.0  9.7  784 
 2006  45.8  29.9  22.6  31.8  443  24.6  17.5  5.9  15.3  543 
  Brazil  1991  15.5  15.1  10.0  14.1  887  13.9  6.4  3.0  8.6  886 
 2006  21.2  13.2  10.4  14.9  609  11.2  5.4  4.4  6.9  859 
 Source : Authors’ tabulations based on the 1990 and 2005 rounds of the World Values Survey data 
fi les 
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being just as fulfi lling, but there is no convincing decline in the opinion that men 
should have priority when jobs are scarce. 
 The Brazilian results with respect to the two family items are equally mixed, but 
different: there is no increase in the percentages considering marriage as an out-
dated institution, and even a drop among female respondents, but there is a system-
atic reduction in percentages considering that a child needs a complete parental 
family. The trend with respect to the gender items is more consistent: there is a rise 
in percentages disagreeing with the fulfi lling nature of being a housewife and a clear 
drop in those giving men priority if jobs are scarce. 
 Table 2.6  Attitudinal changes in issues regarding family and gender in three Latin American 
countries, by age and sex, 1990-2006 
 Men  Women 
 ≤29 
 30–
49  50+  Total  N  ≤29 
 30–
49  50+  Total  N 
 Marriage is an outdated institution (% agree) 
  Argentina  1991  13.5  11.4  4.8  9.6  460  13.7  10.5  4.4  9.2  502 
 2006  38.1  29.0  22.8  29.7  434  38.2  32.3  22.0  30.1  521 
  Chile  1990  18.5  15.4  10.4  15.4  702  17.0  16.1  10.2  14.9  774 
 2006  42.4  26.6  23.3  29.8  433  39.3  29.6  22.3  29.6  530 
  Brazil  1991  29.0  28.4  20.5  26.9  875  32.1  26.1  18.2  26.7  868 
 2006  30.4  21.8  19.2  23.4  619  17.7  19.6  19.7  19.1  871 
 Child needs home with father and mother (% agree) 
  Argentina  1991  91.5  93.4  97.6  94.4  462  94.2  96.1  96.1  95.6  519 
 2006  83.7  93.6  98.0  92.0  449  79.6  80.3  89.9  83.6  518 
  Chile  1990  93.5  93.6  98.2  94.6  708  89.5  90.1  94.1  90.9  781 
 2006  66.7  84.0  89.0  80.9  440  59.3  66.5  78.5  68.6  539 
  Brazil  1991  89.8  92.2  96.5  92.2  890  82.0  80.9  94.0  84.3  885 
 2006  82.6  89.6  91.5  87.9  622  73.2  76.3  81.0  76.6  867 
 Being a housewife is just as fulfi lling (% disagree + strongly disagree) 
  Argentina  1991  42.9  39.0  44.8  42.1  401  54.6  46.6  28.9  42.6  496 
 2006  50.4  45.0  53.4  49.5  364  45.3  46.1  30.9  40.1  506 
  Chile  1990  35.1  23.0  11.9  24.9  687  35.4  29.6  15.3  28.0  765 
 2006  48.3  43.3  24.3  38.4  419  55.4  44.7  31.9  43.0  542 
  Brazil  1991  43.5  36.3  27.2  37.0  862  51.5  39.0  29.4  41.8  872 
 2006  51.9  40.7  39.3  43.8  601  58.7  53.6  45.3  53.0  869 
 Priority for men if jobs are scarce (% agree) 
  Argentina  1991  25.2  23.1  31.1  26.5  471  13.1  21.8  29.8  22.2  517 
 2006  26.9  29.4  32.2  29.5  454  17.6  14.2  32.8  22.0  523 
  Chile  1990  34.0  35.0  50.0  38.1  713  30.3  33.7  49.0  36.5  781 
 2006  24.0  28.9  41.4  31.6  446  21.1  19.8  32.8  24.6  548 
  Brazil  1991  39.8  37.2  45.8  40.1  892  33.8  33.7  49.0  37.2  885 
 2006  26.2  19.9  33.1  25.6  624  10.6  20.1  27.5  19.2  870 
 Source : Authors’ tabulations based on the 1990 and 2005 rounds of the World Values Survey data 
fi les 
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 The question of “what fl ew under the radar” can now be answered partially. The 
ethical dimension has indeed undergone very large shifts during the period under 
consideration. This lends strong support to the thesis that tolerance for various sorts 
of non-conformist behavior, including the rise of “new” cohabitation in Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil, has increased quite dramatically, and that as a consequence, 
the W or “willingness”-condition in the RWA-framework has ceased to be a limiting 
or bottleneck condition. Obviously other changes that remain undocumented here 
could have equally contributed in creating more favorable R and A conditions for 
the Latin American cohabitation boom, but at least it is becoming clear that a cul-
tural shift component is again a necessary (but probably not a suffi cient) ingredient 
of a more complete explanation. 
6  The Family Context of Cohabitation and Single 
Motherhood 
 Not only has there been a rise in unmarried cohabitation, but also in the proportion 
of single mothers (e.g. Arias and Palloni  1996 ; Castro-Martín and Puga  2008 ; 
Castro-Martín et al.  2011 ). Since these features are often linked to increased chances 
of poverty it is essential to know whether cohabitors and single mothers are living 
is nuclear households with presumably essentially neolocal residence or, by contrast 
are co-residing with parents (often three generation households) and/or other kin or 
unrelated persons in extended or composite households. In addition, a nuclear fam-
ily context would be more in line with the notion of a “second demographic 
transition”. 
 In what follows we shall present the most important trends for the period up to 
2000, since the reworking of the IPUMS individual pointers in the household com-
position fi les (Sobek and Kennedy  2009 ) into a new typology (see Esteve et al. 
 2012 ) for the 2010 census round has not yet been completed. But results can be 
presented for 13 Latin American countries. Also, we shall refrain here from giving 
further technical details, as these can be found in Esteve et al.  2012 . 
 More often than not, the shifts in living arrangements of young women are con-
sidered without further reference to the possible presence of other kin or other non- 
relatives. This is not a major issue in situations dealing with European populations 
or populations with European traditions since the neolocal nuclear household is by 
far the dominant one. But matters change considerably when other populations are 
analyzed. In these instances the incidence of extended or composite household 
structures becomes of interest, not only in its own right, but also because such fam-
ily or household structures can absorb or soften the effects of economic shocks, or 
alleviate the consequence of more precarious situations. In the fi rst instance mar-
riage or cohabitation without leaving the parental household could have been a 
response to the period of high economic instability and hyperinfl ation of the 1980s. 
In the second case single mothers could benefi t both fi nancially and in kind from the 
2 The Rise of Cohabitation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970–2011
50
presence of parents, other kin, or even non-relatives. In what follows we shall ana-
lyze our Latin American version of the LIPRO typology (Esteve et al.  2012 : 700–
703) as to reveal to what extent the shifts documented in the previous sections 
occurred within the context of nuclear versus extended or composite households. To 
this end standard tables are extracted from the LIPRO-master table for women 
25–29 which all have the same structure in studying, both per country and over 
time, the internal distribution of 5 individual positions over 3 household situations. 
The 5 individual positions are: single mother, cohabiting or married without chil-
dren, cohabiting or married with children. The 3 household situations are: nuclear, 
extended with parents and possibly other kin or non-kin, and all other forms of 
extensions or composite structures without own parents. Here, we shall consider the 
prevalence of  any form of extension (i.e. with parents, kin or non-relatives) for each 
of the 5 union subcategories. These percentages extended (or composite with non- 
kin) of all types are given in Table  2.7 . The complement of these percentages gives 
the incidence of living in nuclear households.
 Table  2.7 illustrates that very considerable proportions of young women 25–29 
still live in extended or composite families. This is particularly so for single moth-
ers, with fi gures typically ranging between two thirds and four fi fths. Only in Bolivia 
and Puerto Rico are these proportions below 60 %. 3 The degree of splitting off from 
3  For a more detailed analysis of the residential family context for single mothers in these 13 coun-
tries, see Esteve et al.  2012 , especially pages 709–714. 
 Table 2.7  Percentage of women 25–29 living in extended/composite households by type of union, 
Latin American Countries, latest available census data 
 Single 
mothers 
 Cohabiting, no 
children 
 Married, no 
children 
 Cohabiting 
with children 
 Married with 
children 
 Chile 2002  81.8  37.4  37.3  29.2  24.6 
 Argentina 
2001 
 73.4  28.3  21.9  23.2  19.7 
 Colombia 
2005 
 72.7  41.1  28.3  26.9  25.9 
 Ecuador 2001  67.7  59.8  51.9  32.2  26.8 
 Venezuela 
2001 
 79.4  50.1  42.6  29.4  30.4 
 Panama 2000  73.4  41.4  32.2  31.6  28.9 
 Puerto Rico 
1990 
 40.0  41.9  14.6  10.4  90.1 
 Costa Rica 
2000 
 66.1  37.0  21.5  18.8  15.0 
 Brazil 2000  69.4  26.0  18.1  17.9  14.3 
 Mexico 2000  72.5  37.1  31.2  20.8  18.7 
 Peru 2007  71.6  54.8  52.7  33.6  31.9 
 Bolivia 2001  56.8  59.9  56.9  28.9  29.1 
 Cuba 2002  74.2  44.7  51.3  27.9  38.0 
 Source : Authors’ tabulations based on census samples from IPUMS-International 
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the parental or otherwise extended household upon the formation of a partnership, 
either through marriage or cohabitation, can be assessed in the next two columns: 
still a third to over one half of young childless women in a partnership are com-
monly found in extended or composite households. Only in Argentina and Brazil do 
we fi nd lower fi gures of the order of one quarter. Equally remarkable is that the dif-
ferences between the cohabiting and the married women without children in the 
percentages living in extended households vary substantially between countries, but 
with the percentages for childless cohabitors systematically being higher than for 
their married counterparts. This may indicate that further splitting off from the 
parental household occurs when a cohabiting union is converted into a married one. 
Regardless of the actual process, all of this means that cohabiting partners are 
accepted as residents in extended households in very much the same way as married 
spouses. In other words, cohabitation does not lead to more nuclear households 
being formed, and in countries with a strong tradition for coresidence of young 
couples with parents and/or others, this tradition is maintained for cohabitors as 
well. 
 As indicated, the incidence of co-residence varies substantially from country to 
country. In Argentina and Brazil, co-residence in an extended household is least 
common for cohabiting childless couples, and it is equally rare for childless married 
ones in these two countries and in Puerto Rico. At the high end of the distribution 
for both types of couples are Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Cuba, with 
percentages in extended households typically in excess of 40 %. As expected, co- 
residence with parents or other adults drops further for cohabiting and married 
women with children. There is still a slight tendency for cohabiting mothers to be 
found more frequently in extended households than for married mothers, but this 
tendency is not universal. More striking is the lasting difference between countries. 
Puerto Rico, Costa Rica and Brazil have fewer than 20 % of young married or 
cohabiting mothers living in extended households, whereas the fi gures for Venezuela, 
Peru, Bolivia, Panama and Cuba are still in range of 30–40 %. 
 There are two substantive conclusions to be drawn from these fi ndings. First, the 
more precise nature of the “robustness” of Latin American families to the economic 
shocks of hyperinfl ation in the 1980s, as perceived by Fussell and Palloni ( 2004 ), 
lies in the fact that co-residence with parents or others remains the rule for single 
mothers, and also remains very common for both cohabiting and married couples 
without children. And second, there is a caveat with respect to the Latin American 
convergence to the pattern of the “Second demographic transition” (SDT). The 
sheer size of the cohabitation boom and the de-stigmatization of unmarried unions 
defi nitely fi t the SDT prediction, but the convergence to a purely western pattern is 
only a partial one given that signifi cant proportions of childless cohabiting couples 
and a still noticeable percentage of cohabiting parents are not living in a nuclear 
household but in extended and/or composite ones. For such couples it is harder to 
imagine that cohabitation would be merely a “trial marriage” between two individu-
als. Hence for several countries there is a clearly distinct Latin American version of 
one of the key aspects of the SDT, and it is produced by the historical context of 
continued robustness of co-residence in extended households for a signifi cant seg-
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ment of the population. For the others, however, and they are a majority (9 countries 
of the 13 considered here), cohabitants do live predominantly in a neolocal and 
nuclear setting, and for them the convergence to the western SDT pattern is much 
more likely. 
7  Conclusions 
 The reconstruction of the share of cohabitation in the process of union formation of 
both men and women in 665 Latin American regions indicates that there has been a 
real “cohabitation boom” taking place since the 1960s in some instances and accel-
erating during the 1990s in most. This holds particularly, but not exclusively, in 
areas which had relatively low levels of “old” or traditional cohabitation with a 
historical ethnic background. Furthermore, the upward trend shows no signs of 
abating during the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, and latecomers such as 
Mexico and Uruguay have caught up with the others. Hence, the lion’s share of the 
boom is due to “new” cohabitation. Moreover, the negative gradient of cohabitation 
with female education is somewhat alleviated over time since the rise in cohabita-
tion affected all educational categories, with the middle educational groups and the 
more educated catching up to a signifi cant extent. 
 This raises the question whether or not this feature signals a partial convergence 
of Latin American countries to the European pattern of the so called “second demo-
graphic transition”. The discussion of this question has already emerged in the Latin 
American literature (García and Rojas  2004 ; Cabella et al.  2004 ; Rodríguez Vignoli 
 2005 ; Quilodrán  2008 ; Castro-Martín et al.  2011 ; Salinas and Potter  2011 ; Covre- 
Sussai and Matthijs  2010 ). Two arguments are offered here in favor of such a con-
vergence. Firstly, on the basis of both the negative cross-sectional gradient with 
education and the steep rises in female education, one would expect the share of 
marriage to gain importance, and not the share of cohabitation. Secondly, for three 
major countries with a sizeable increase in “new” cohabitation (Chile, Brazil, 
Argentina) data from two rounds of the World Values Studies show major changes, 
if not a landslide, in the direction of greater tolerance for previously tabooed behav-
ior or actions, such as euthanasia, homosexuality, and suicide. Moreover, several 
other attitudes in favor of greater secularism, of non-conformist family arrange-
ments, or more egalitarian gender relations emerged during the 15 year period docu-
mented by the WVS. These ideational changes, and particularly those in ethics, are 
indicative of the fact that the cohabitation boom has indeed developed in a context 
of growing individual autonomy and greater overall tolerance. 
 The expansion of cohabitation and of parenthood among cohabitants, or the 
“non-conformist transition”, is not the only hallmark of the SDT. The other major 
ingredient is the so called “postponement transition” with the shift to older ages of 
both nuptiality and fertility. In Western and Northern Europe, both the non- 
conformist and the postponement parts occurred more or less simultaneously. In 
advanced Asian industrial societies, the marriage and fertility postponement pre-
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ceded the hitherto modest increase in cohabitation by three decades. A similar 
 timing gap was witnessed in Southern Europe. The Latin American experience pro-
vides an illustration of the reverse, with the “non-conformist transition” preceding 
the postponement one. If that proposition holds, we should now be looking out for 
rises in ages at fi rst birth and further drops in fertility to below replacement levels. 
 Appendix 
 Table 2.8  Sample characteristics, numbers of cases and numbers of regions within the 24 Latin 
American countries 
 Women in all unions  Men in all unions 
 Country  Year 
 Sample 
density 
(%) 
 Age 
25–29 
 Age 
30–34 
 Age 
25–29 
 Age 
30–34  Type of unit 
 # 
Units 
 Argentina  1970  2.0  11,951  12,594  9,410  11,565  Province  24 
 1980  10.0  73,547  73,733  62,566  72,154  Province  24 
 1991  10.0  108,866  119,285  90,369  113,934  Province  24 
 2001  10.0  82,852  89,599  68,084  83,112  Province  24 
 2010  100  943,348  1,129,914  789,937  1,050,519  Province  24 
 Belize  2000  100  7,133  6,417  6,364  6,205  District  6 
 Bolivia  2001  10.0  21,002  20,533  18,001  19,275  Department  9 
 Brazil  1970  5.0  128,358  119,990  108,100  120,653  State  26 
 1980  5.0  175,376  152,298  157,046  157,778  Meso-region  137 
 1991  5.8  248,620  245,327  210,307  238,203  Meso-region  137 
 2000  6.0  269,940  288,332  229,222  275,801  Meso-region  137 
 2010  5.0  263,214  277,735  219,781  260,804  Meso-region  137 
 Chile  1970  10.0  21,923  20,134  18,653  19,269  Region  13 
 1982  10.0  31,884  30,151  27,873  29,992  Region  13 
 1992  10.0  41,721  43,286  34,968  41,737  Region  13 
 2002  10.0  34,803  42,994  27,592  39,349  Region  13 
 Colombia  1973  10.0  47,046  42,346  34,580  38,717  Department  30 
 1985  10.0  80,109  67,829  60,629  66,113  Department  33 
 1993  10.0  97,898  96,791  76,585  90,675  Department  31 
 2005  10.0  95,127  97,155  77,645  88,833  Department  33 
 Costa Rica  1973  10.0  4,430  3,970  3,790  4,032  Canton  79 
 1984  10.0  7,380  6,591  6,616  6,749  Canton  81 
 2000  10.0  10,242  11,364  8,391  10,750  Canton  81 
 2011  100  111,281  117,085  88,032  106,528  Canton  81 
 Cuba  2002  10.0  31,355  40,142  26,048  37,580  Province  15 
 Dominican 
Republic 
 1981  100  142,937  125,852  116,401  123,137  Province  27 
 2002  100  237,271  237,546  182,759  221,813  Province  32 
 2010  100  236,252  243,514  191,157  228,886  Province  32 
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Table 2.8 (continued)
 Women in all unions  Men in all unions 
 Country  Year 
 Sample 
density 
(%) 
 Age 
25–29 
 Age 
30–34 
 Age 
25–29 
 Age 
30–34  Type of unit 
 # 
Units 
 Ecuador  1974  10.0  16,243  13,543  15,839  15,654  Province  20 
 1982  10.0  22,534  19,787  19,492  20,050  Province  21 
 1990  10.0  28,991  26,605  23,770  25,744  Province  21 
 2001  10.0  33,923  33,228  28,616  32,206  Province  24 
 2010  100  403,372  391,765  352,850  374,881  Province  24 
 El 
Salvador 
 1992  10.0  13,828  12,349  11,177  11,258  Department  14 
 2007  10.0  15,170  15,116  12,102  12,808  Department  14 
 Guatemala  1994  100  226,512  219,725  194,895  208,141  Department  22 
 2002  100  308,775  280,528  252,157  255,117  Department  22 
 Guyana  2002  100  20,423  20,964  16,276  19,898  –  - 
 Honduras  2001  100  161,683  139,256  135,453  132,210  Departament  18 
 Mexico  1970  1.0  13,275  10,914  11,370  10,785  State  32 
 1990  10.0  251,282  231,777  209,584  216,167  State  32 
 2000  10.6  311,063  300,694  260,268  276,893  State  32 
 2010  10.0  317,419  337,031  264,654  306,820  State  32 
 Nicaragua  1971  10.0  4,937  3,931  3,769  3,542  Departament  15 
 1995  10.0  12,037  10,038  10,230  9,775  Departament  15 
 2005  10.0  14,729  12,709  13,022  12,360  Departament  15 
 Panama  1970  10.0  3,921  3,384  3,307  3,169  –  – 
 1980  10.0  5,412  4,991  4,347  4,916  –  – 
 1990  10.0  6,653  6,172  5,459  5,966  District  74 
 2000  10.0  7,953  8,047  6,580  7,600  District  75 
 2010  10.0  8,832  9,131  7,604  8,575  District  75 
 Peru  1981  100  437,398  385,974  348,016  378,091  Department  22 
 1993  10.0  61,926  60,788  49,143  56,845  Department  25 
 2007  10.0  73,421  76,790  61,394  71,985  Department  25 
 Puerto 
Rico 
 1970  1.0  740  654  606  600  –  – 
 1980  5.0  4,326  4,560  3,799  4,336  –  – 
 1990  5.0  4,240  4,542  3,691  4,128  –  – 
 Trinidad & 
Tobago 
 1990  100  30,276  31,390  –  –  –  – 
 2000  100  21,312  25,608  –  –  Parish  15 
 2010  100  27,065  29,071  –  –  Region  21 
 Uruguay  1975  10.0  6,905  7,211  5,455  6,523  Department  19 
 1985  10.0  7,707  7,642  6,443  7,099  Department  19 
 1996  10.0  7,388  8,472  5,989  7,961  Department  19 
 2010  100  66,529  80,500  53,761  72,826  Department  19 
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Table 2.8 (continued)
 Women in all unions  Men in all unions 
 Country  Year 
 Sample 
density 
(%) 
 Age 
25–29 
 Age 
30–34 
 Age 
25–29 
 Age 
30–34  Type of unit 
 # 
Units 
 Venezuela  1971  10.0  27,616  24,586  22,828  24,653  State  24 
 1981  10.0  41,685  36,022  37,357  37,231  State  24 
 1990  10.0  46,707  44,909  41,354  44,621  State  24 
 2001  10.0  59,709  62,640  49,570  58,867  State  24 
 Source : Authors’ tabulations based on census samples from IPUMS-International 
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